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ABSTRACT. Despite Congressional and Presidential emphasis on reducing 
bundling and consolidation of defense contracts, recent research studies 
cast doubt on whether bundling and consolidation are problems for small 
defense contractors or for the defense acquisition system as a whole.  On 
the contrary, those studies proposed that bundling and consolidation ought 
to be validated as legitimate tools to achieve best value for defense buyers.  
This paper tests these propositions by examining U.S. Department of the 
Navy (DON) bundled and consolidated contracts for FY2010, the record year 
for bundling and consolidation in U.S. defense contracting.  Specifically, the 
paper examines the effect of bundling and consolidation on performance of 
Navy and Marine Corps buying commands in meeting small business goals, 
as well as on good-government policy objectives such as competition, 
performance-based acquisition, preference for commercial suppliers, and 
support for the U.S. defense industrial base.  The paper concludes by 
recommending the Secretary of the Navy’s Office of Small Business Program 
(SECNAV OSBP) seven new strategies for challenging bundling and 
consolidation.  Such strategies will enable SECNAV OSBP to improve not only 
DON performance on small business goals, but also the defense acquisition 
system as a whole.     
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Bundling and consolidation of purchasing requirements into large-
dollar, large-scope, large-geography contacts is commonly regarded 
as a major barrier to entry into the Federal, and especially the 
Department of Defense (DOD), procurement market. (HASC 2012, 
Kidalov 2011). Since 1997, Congress and Presidential 
administrations have championed a series of major laws and 
regulatory initiatives to reduce bundling and consolidation.  (Kidalov 
2011). While earlier research strongly supported the need for anti-
bundling initiatives in order to enhance small business opportunities 
and promote competition (SBA Advocacy 2004), some recent studies 
cast doubt on whether consolidation and bundling are problems for 
small business contractors.  (Moore 2008, Nerenz 2007, GAO 2004).  
In particular, two recent studies suggested bundling and 
consolidation may be positive or even best-practice purchasing 
activities with major benefits for the defense acquisition system or 
supplier base. (Moore 2008, Nerenz 2007).  With support from the 
Secretary of the Navy’s Office of Small Business Programs (SECNAV 
OSBP), my study attempts to resolve the conflict among these studies 
by analyzing Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation 
(FPDS-NG) data on bundled and consolidated contracts awarded by 
the Department of the Navy (DON) during Fiscal Year 2010.  That 
year, reported bundling and consolidation in defense contracting 
reached a recent record of 224 contracts worth $21.1 billion, (HASC 
2012), of which the DON share was 44 contracts (about 20 percent) 
worth well over $0.8 billion (about 4 percent).  My study addresses 
these contracts’ features, the buying commands’ actions, and those 
commands’ records on achieving small business contracting goals.  
 
BUNDLING AND CONSOLIDATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Contract bundling and consolidation are regulated by a 
complementary legal framework.  Initially, contract bundling was 
recognized as an implied cause of action invoked under the 
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Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 to protest contract 
solicitations as unduly restrictive of competition.  (Kidalov 2011).  
Eventually, beginning with the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 
1997 and continuing with the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004, Congress passed and Presidents Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush signed two laws establishing specific criteria to limit 
and regulate bundling and consolidation.  (Kidalov 2011, Manuel 
2010.)  (This study does not address the effects of any post-FY2010 
legislative or regulatory changes.)  The legal concepts of bundling and 
consolidation substantially overlap, although “the rules that apply to 
bundling are more restrictive.” (DOD OSBP 2007).  “In the most 
general terms, for DOD, a consolidation is the combining of two or 
more previous contracts into a single solicitation, and a bundled 
contract is a consolidation that is unsuitable for award to a small 
business as a prime contractor even though one or more of the 
previous contracts was performed (or could have been performed) by 
a small business. To put it another way, a solicitation that 
consolidates requirements does not always bundle them, but a 
solicitation that bundles requirements always consolidates them.”   
(DOD OSBP 2007).   
 
The Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, codified in the 
Small Business Act at 15 U.S.C. § 632, defines a “bundled contract” 
as “a contract that is entered into to meet requirements that are 
consolidated in a bundling of contract requirements.”  In turn, this 
statute defines  “bundling of contract requirements” as 
“consolidating 2 or more procurement requirements for goods or 
services previously provided or performed under separate smaller 
contracts into a solicitation of offers for a single contract that is likely 
to be unsuitable for award to a small-business concern due to—(A) the 
diversity, size, or specialized nature of the elements of the 
performance specified; (B) the aggregate dollar value of the 
anticipated award; (C) the geographical dispersion of the contract 
performance sites; or (D) any combination of the factors described in 
subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C).”  The term “separate smaller 
contract” is further defined as “a contract that has been performed by 
1 or more small business concerns or was suitable for award to 1 or 
more small business concerns.”  Factors specified in the Act as those 
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“that might cause unsuitability for award to small business” include 
“the diversity, size, or specialized nature” of performance called for in 
the contract, the total dollar value of the contract, the geographic 
spread of performance, or a combination of these factors.  (U.S. Code 
2010).  “Substantial bundling” of defense contracts at over $7.5 
million requires identification of alternative buying strategies and 
additional reviews.  (FAR 7.104 2010).    
 
The contract consolidation law, Section 801 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, codified at 10 U.S.C. §2382 
(2010) and implemented by DFARS 207.170-3 (2009), is not focused 
on prior performance by small businesses.  It simply prohibits 
consolidation of two or more “contract requirements” totaling over 
$5.5 million unless the senior procurement executive of a defense 
agency conducts market research, identifies alternatives involving 
“lesser degrees of consolidation,” and determines that consolidation 
is necessary and justified.   Section 2382 defines “consolidation of 
contract requirements” and “consolidation” as “a use of a solicitation 
to obtain offers for a single contract or a multiple award contract to 
satisfy two or more requirements of that [military] department, 
agency, or activity for goods or services that have previously been 
provided to, or performed for, that department, agency, or activity 
under two or more separate contracts smaller in cost than the total 
cost of the contract for which the offers are solicited.”  (U.S. Code 
2010; DFARS 2010).   
 
Both the bundling and the consolidation statutes allow defense 
buyers to determine that bundling or consolidation was “necessary 
and justified” if they identified “measurably substantial benefits” from 
bundling, or if benefits from consolidation “substantially exceed[ing]” 
benefits from alternatives to consolidation.  (U.S. Code 2010).  In 
both statutes, justification criteria are qualitatively identical and 
include cost, quality, acquisition cycle efficiencies, improved terms 
and conditions, and any other benefits.  The difference is that 
bundling benefits must generally be dollarized to between 5 and 10 
percent of contract value, unless senior acquisition officials 
determine that the acquisition strategy is mission critical and 
provides for maximum practicable small business participation (FAR 
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7.107 2009).  Section 2382 does not require dollarized benefits.  
Both statutes specify that administrative or personnel costs alone do 
not justify bundling unless they are at least 10 percent of contract 
value, or unless they are “substantial” in relation to the consolidated 
contract value.  (U.S. Code 2010).  Finally, bundling limitations apply 
only to contracts awarded or performed in the U.S. and only to 
contracts not awarded as small business set-asides, while contract 
consolidation limitations apply worldwide to small and large business 
contracts alike, including to new work.  (DOD OSBP 2007).  
 
RECENT STUDIES AND KEY RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
 
Review of research literatures shows that contract bundling and 
consolidation has received scant research evaluation.  Over the last 
decade, only four major studies addressed the subject: the 2002 
Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy study performed by 
Eagle Eye Publishers, Inc., The Impact of Contract Bundling on Small 
Business, the 2004 GAO report 04-545, Contract Management: 
Impact of Strategy to Mitigate Effects of Contract  Bundling on Small 
Business Is Uncertain,  the 2007 Nerenz article, Government 
Contract Bundling: Myths and Mistaken Identity (reporting his 2006 
study),  and the 2008 Moore, Grammich, DaVanzo, Held, Coombs, 
and Mele study, Rand Corporation National Defense Research 
Institute Technical Report 601-1, Enhancing Small Business 
Opportunities in the DOD.  Only the latter study discussed both 
bundling and Section 2382 consolidation.  While the 2002 study 
found contract bundling and consolidation detrimental for small firms 
and the acquisition system overall, the 2007-08 studies made 
contrary propositions, and the 2004 study appeared non-committal.  
 
Proposition 1: Contract Bundling is Not a Serious Obstacle to 
Small Business Participation in Government/Defense Contracting.  
The SBA Advocacy study asserted that contract bundling was 
rampant, involving well over 34,000 contract actions and driving 
approximately 15,000 small firms out of business. (SBA Advocacy 
2002).  It found the following trend: “In FY 2001 both the number of 
bundled contracts and the amount of bundled contract dollars were 
the highest in 10 years. . . In FY 2001 bundled contracts accounted 
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for 16.4 percent of the reported 177,000 prime contracts and 51 
percent of all reported prime contract spending.” (SBA Advocacy 
2002).   That study’s conclusion that contract bundling was a serious 
problem for small firms was later adopted by the White House Office 
of Federal Procurement Policy. (OFPP 2002).  However, three 
subsequent studies have cast doubt on the SBA Advocacy’s 
methodology and/or conclusion.  The Moore 2008 study suggested 
that contract bundling and consolidation at DOD “will lead to fewer 
small business contracts,” but implied they were presently 
insubstantial problems for small firms.  In support, the Moore study 
cited FPDS data showing that neither bundling nor consolidation 
amounted to more than 2 percent of DOD contract awards or contract 
dollars during FY 2001-FY 2007.  (Moore, et al. 2008.)  The Moore 
study observed that consolidation/bundling “practices may have 
mixed results for small-business opportunities, reducing the number 
of small businesses receiving prime contracts but possibly providing 
them the same total dollars.”  (Moore, et al. 2008).  The Moore study 
also cited the Nerenz (2006-2007) study, which found that contract 
bundling was protested at less than 2 percent of all bid protests filed 
at the GAO during the years 1995-2004.  Both the Moore and the 
Nerenz studies suggested that the SBA Advocacy study was 
drastically over-inclusive.  Nerenz also noted that the SBA Advocacy 
study used a broad extra-statutory definition of bundling.  (Nerenz 
2007).  The GAO 2004 report found that DOD awarded almost 3,400 
FY2002 contracts which exceeded its substantial bundling threshold, 
accounting for over 75 percent of DOD prime contracting dollars.  
However, the GAO was able to validate bundling designation for only 
8, and did not provide their dollar value or share of DOD contracts. 
(GAO 2004).    
 
Proposition 2. Small Firms Lack the Capability to Perform 
Legitimately Combined Military/Government Needs, and So Are 
Properly Excluded from Justified Bundled or Consolidated Contracts.  
This proposition reflects current law, as noted above.  Its strongest 
proponent was the Nerenz article, which suggested that all bundling 
not protested by small businesses and/or not approved by the SBA 
was at least presumptively proper and so properly excluded small 
firms.  (Nerenz 2007). The 2004 GAO study did not address this 
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proposition, simply finding that most agencies reported that they did 
not engage in bundling. (GAO 2004).  The SBA Advocacy study 
challenged this proposition only indirectly.  It defined a bundled 
contract simply as one that “incorporates dissimilar activities” and 
lowered the definition of a substantially bundled contract to $1 
million, but did not address when such contracts may be justified or 
necessary. (SBA Advocacy, 2002).   As a result, Advocacy included a 
substantial volume of contracts awarded to small businesses into its 
data of bundled contracts – thereby showing that small firms have 
the capabilities to perform at least some combined requirements.  On 
the other hand, the Moore study suggested that small businesses 
were excluded from consolidated DOD contracts because of large 
firms’ capabilities to meet customer needs such as Performance-
Based/Life-Cycle Logistics on service contracts, “systems-of-systems” 
engineering in weapons contracts, and business choices of major 
aerospace and defense manufacturers to outsource work.  The Moore 
study recommended that DOD “may wish to consider where small 
businesses can best contribute to innovation, including at Tier 1 or 
lower-level suppliers.” (Moore, et al. 2008). 
 
Proposition 3: Except for Alleged Problems for Small 
Businesses, Contract Bundling and Consolidation Provide an Overall 
Benefit to the Defense Acquisition System.  The Moore study was the 
strongest proponent of this proposition.  It asserted that contract 
bundling is driven by two influences of commercial practices used by 
the industry to enhance efficiencies and improve performance.  “The 
first, prevalent in supply chain purchases, is . . . achieving superior 
quality, responsiveness, and lower total costs through supply chain 
transformation. . . . [A]s manufacturers have sought to reduce waste 
through “lean” practices such as minimal inventory, “just-in-time” 
supply, and use of fewer, larger, and more complex assemblies, they 
have also sought to use a smaller, more stable supply base that is 
well integrated with product design and synchronized with 
manufacturing. . . . Leading commercial firms, and the federal 
government, have similarly sought to develop strategic sourcing . . 
Focusing on longer-term relationships with these suppliers can also 
improve quality in the supply chain.”  (Moore, et al. 2008).  “The 
second influence on commercial practices is the grouping of goods 
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and services together into one offering, particularly as a company’s 
goods become more like commodities with lower profits and their 
services (e.g., repairs) for these goods become more profitable.”  
Such contract structure, supposedly, “guarantees a level of 
operational performance and charges the customer a fee based on 
the hours” the manufactured product is used.  “Similarly, the DoD 
may expect its leading suppliers to offer more goods and services 
grouped together for purchase such as those it seeks for 
performance-based logistics.” (Moore 2008).  As stated above, the 
Moore study concluded that these commercial practices lead DOD to 
adopt Performance-Based Logistics, Strategic Sourcing, Total Life 
Cycle Systems Management, and similar measures to cut costs and 
increase performance of government contractors, and claimed that 
“best practices” in the area of cost-cutting and performance were are 
odds with increased small business participation.  The Moore study 
called on DOD to track consolidation in the private sector so as to 
explain or justify consolidation in DOD contracts. (Moore, et al. 2008.) 
 
The contrary position was taken by the SBA Advocacy study, 
which asserted that “the growing lack of diversity and stratification in 
the federal industrial base being fueled by bundling will have long 
term and detrimental consequences to the government’s ability to 
procure needed services and supplies at competitive prices.” (SBA 
Advocacy 2004).  However, this assertion was not specifically tested 
in terms of analyzing the impact of bundling on competition or 
performance across the acquisition system.  The 2004 GAO study, 
similarly, did not address systemic effects of bundling, but claimed 
that FPDS data was not accurate or sufficient to do so.  (GAO 2004.)  
On the other hand, Nerenz argued that low bid protests filings 
challenging bundled contracts government-wide (less than 5 in the 
years 1995-2004) in comparison with the annual rate of protests 
filed (1,300 to almost 3,000 per year) showed either that bundling 
was extremely rare or that all bundling that was not protested was 
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DATA FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: TESTING KEY PROPOSITIONS 
 
FINDING I. High-Value Contract Bundling is Symptomatic of Below-
Average Small Business Contracting Performance by Navy 
Commands.  Although Nerenz (2007) and Moore, et al. (2008) 
strongly criticized bundling and/or consolidation as overblown 
problems for small business in the Federal market, neither study 
examined whether a relationship exists between 
bundling/consolidation and achieving small business goals.  Data 
shows this relationship exists.  During FY2010, total U.S. Department 
of the Navy bundled and consolidated contracts amounted to 
$831,948,735.18.  The top commands engaging in bundling and 
consolidation are NAVFAC ENGINEERING COMMAND EUROPE & 
SOUTHWEST ASIA and COMMANDER MARCORCYSCOM (Marine Corps 
Systems Command), which together accounted for over 52 percent of 
bundled and consolidated contract dollars.  Commands in the middle 
tier for bundling and consolidation are NAVFAC EXPEDITIONARY, 
NAVSUP FLEET LOGISTICS CENTER NORFOLK, NAWSUP WEAPON 
SYSTEM SUPPORT MECHANICSBURG, NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE 
CENTER CRANE, SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND, 
and STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, together accounting for over 
38 percent of bundled and consolidated contracts value.  The lowest 
levels of bundled and consolidated awards took place at NAVAL AIR 
SYSTEMS COMMAND, NAVSEA HEADQUARTERS, NAVFAC 
SOUTHEAST, SOUTWEST, AND HAWAII, NAVAIR, and NAVSUP 
WEAPONS SYSTEMS SUPPORT PHILADELPHIA, together accounting 
for a little less than 9 percent of bundled and consolidated contracts 
value.  
 
BUNDLING AND COSOLIDATION ACTIVITY BY COMMAND 
Command Contracts Value Command Share 
NAVAL FAC ENGINEEERING CMD EUR SWA $274,320,944.32 32.97% 
COMMANDER MARCORSYSCOM $162,533,621.00 19.54% 
NSWC CRANE $81,871,194.00 9.84% 
NAVSUP WEAPON SYSTEMS SUPPORT MECH $79,342,491.00 9.54% 
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS $49,437,854.00 5.94% 
NAVAL FACILITIES EXPEDITIONARY $46,353,072.00 5.57% 
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SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS $32,111,171.93 3.86% 
NAVSUP FLT LOG CTR NORFOLK $32,036,988.03 3.85% 
NAVSEA HQ $16,120,500.00 1.94% 
NAVSUP WEAPON SYSTEMS SUPPORT $15,538,153.90 1.87% 
NAVFAC ENGINEERING COMMAND HAWAII $13,760,057.00 1.65% 
NAVFAC SOUTHWEST $11,714,772.00 1.41% 
NAVFAC SOUTHEAST $10,037,000.00 1.21% 
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND $6,770,916.00 0.81% 
Grand Total $831,948,735.18 100.00% 
Figure 1. Bundling & Consolidation Activity by Command 
 
Within the DON, the overall small business share of contract dollars 
amounted to 15.99 percent in FY2010.  Commands which did not 
report engaging in bundling or consolidation showed a 32.78 percent 
small business share – more than doubling DON performance.  In 
contrast, commands which engaged in bundling or consolidation 
collectively demonstrated small business performance at half of DON 
average: only 7.69 percent.  For individual commands, this 
correlation is not linear.  However, all 7 commands which engaged in 
bundling or consolidation and also performed at below DON-wide 
small business share (MARCORSYSCOM, SPAWAR, NAVSUP WEAPON 
SYS SUPPORT PHILA, NAVSEA HQ, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, 
NAVAIR SYSCOM PAX RIVER, and NAVFAC EUR SWA) together 
accounted for 66.93 percent, or about two-thirds of DON’s total 
bundled and consolidated dollars.  The other 7 commands exceeded 
DON small business performance and accounted for only one-third of 
total bundled and consolidated dollars.   Thus, high volumes of 
bundling and consolidation can predict subpar performance on small 
business contracting.   
 








NAVFAC HAWAII $321,095,593.32 $150,609,557.31 $168,736,585.73 52.55% 
















$1,074,217,227.59 $770,910,414.14 $300,582,707.92 27.98% 
NAVSUP FLT LOG 
CTR NORFOLK 
$1,775,484,225.14 $1,119,896,031.29 $412,444,749.01 23.23% 
NSWC CRANE $1,400,599,909.85 $1,137,087,934.65 $256,363,949.31 18.30% 
MARCORSYSCOM 
QUANTICO 
$7,183,482,758.10 $6,043,542,233.92 $1,091,532,717.39 15.20% 
SPAWAR SAN DIEGO $2,616,862,292.52 $2,434,239,814.78 $181,038,679.74 6.92% 
NAVSUP WEAP SYS 
SUPPORT PHILA 
$1,944,930,431.48 $1,875,723,849.15 $60,103,423.73 3.09% 




$1,937,492,455.08 $1,491,199,854.01 $54,055,062.89 2.79% 
NAVAL FAC ENG 
CMD EUR SWA 
SIGONELLA 
$230,422,259.81 $229,535,685.16 $815,763.12 0.35% 
NAVAIR SYS COM 
PAX RIVER 










$28,980,314,089.75 $18,720,931,455.83 $9,525,462,646.60 32.87% 
DEPARTMENT OF 
THE NAVY TOTAL 
$87,855,922,482.70 $71,631,070,766.05 $14,052,195,410.22 15.99% 
Figure 2. Bundling and Small Business Performance of 
Navy Commands 
 
Kidalov   
3664 
FINDING 2. Small Businesses Have the Capability to Perform Most 
Bundled or Consolidated Contracts, Suggesting Their Exclusion is Not 
Ability-Based.  Based on the SBA Advocacy/OFPP methodology (OFPP 
2002), small firms would have lost contracting opportunities worth 
about one-third of total value of bundled or consolidated contracts.  
The real adverse impact on small firms, however, is much higher: 
between 95 and 83 percent of total value of bundled and 
consolidated contracts.   
 
First, data shows that small businesses were excluded from over 95 
percent of bundled and consolidated contracts – belying any 
optimistic assertions that such practices do not affect small business 
contract spending. Bundling and consolidation of DON contracts was 
largely concentrated among a limited group of major U.S. defense 
contractors and select international firms.  A total of 23 firms became 
the beneficiaries of 44 bundled and consolidated contracts, receiving 
on average about 2 such contracts each.  The top two firms, 
Derichebourg Multiservizi SPA and The Heil Co., received 
approximately $182 million or 21.85 percent, and $141 million or 
16.91 percent, respectively.  Together, they received almost over 
$322 million or 39 percent of value of such contracts.   Next, a group 
of 9 firms, EDO Communications and Countermeasures Systems, 
Lockheed Martin, Sociedad Espaniola de Montajes Industriales, 
Interstate Electronics, Navistar Defense, LLC, Sentek Consulting, 
Harris Corp., La Termica SRL, and U.S. Training Center, Inc. (a/k/a 
Blackwater and Academi), received between 2 and 10 percent of 
such contracts each, and collectively received 49.36 percent of such 
contracts or almost $411 million.  Another group of 9 firms, BAE 
Systems Land & Armaments, Tetra Tech, W.G. Yates & Cons 
Construction, Bell Boeing Joint Project Office, Triton Marine 
Construction, Multinational Logistic Services, Lockheed Martin 
Services, United Infrastructure Projects FZCO, Radiology Services of 
Hampton Roads, Avis Rent-a-car, and Hawaiian Dredging 
Construction, received less than 2 percent each, or a total of about 
12 percent or a little under $99 million.  Just two firms, Radiology 
Services and Sentek, which received just $38 million or 4.54 percent 
of contracts, were coded as small businesses.  No size verification 
was made in this study.   
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BUNDLING AND CONDOLIDATION BENEFICIARIES 
Contractors Contracts Value Share 
HAWAIIAN DREDGING CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. $5,574,000.00 0.67% 
AVIS RENT A CAR $5,638,320.00 0.68% 
RADIOLOGY SERVICES OF HAMPTON ROADS LLC $5,674,321.96 0.68% 
UNITED INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS FZCO $5,905,588.00 0.71% 
LOCKHEED MARTIN SERVICES INC $6,770,916.00 0.81% 
RAYTHEON COMPANY $6,935,563.00 0.83% 
MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC SERVICES LTD $7,652,611.42 0.92% 
TRITON MARINE CONSTRUCTION CORP. $8,186,057.00 0.98% 
BELL BOEING JOINT PROJECT OFFI $8,602,590.90 1.03% 
W. G. YATES & SONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY $10,037,000.00 1.21% 
TETRA TECH EC, INC. $11,714,772.00 1.41% 
BAE SYSTEMS LAND & ARMAMENTS, L.P. $16,120,500.00 1.94% 
U.S. TRAINING CENTER, INC. $18,710,054.65 2.25% 
LA TERMICA SRL $21,000,000.00 2.52% 
HARRIS CORPORATION $21,862,016.00 2.63% 
SENTEK CONSULTING INCORPORATED $32,111,171.93 3.86% 
NAVISTAR DEFENSE LLC $46,353,072.00 5.57% 
INTERSTATE ELECTRONICS CORPORATION $49,437,854.00 5.94% 
SOCIEDAD ESPAIOLA DE MONTAJES INDUSTRIALES SA $60,000,000.00 7.21% 
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION $79,342,491.00 9.54% 
EDO COMMUNICATIONS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
SYSTEMS INC. $81,871,194.00 9.84% 
HEIL CO., THE $140,671,605.00 16.91% 
DERICHEBOURG MULTISERVIZI SPA $181,777,036.32 21.85% 
Grand Total $831,948,735.18 100.00% 
 Figure 3. Contractors Benefiting from Bundling/Consolidation 
 
Second, data shows that small businesses have the capability to 
perform about 83 percent of bundled and consolidated Navy 
contracts.   A key de facto measure of small business capability are 
the SBA size standards, which are measured on either employee or 
revenue basis and are assigned to each North American Industrial 
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Classification System (NAICS) category.   Since 1997, Contracting 
Officers have relied on SBA’s size standards tied to the North 
American Industrial Classification System (“NAICS”) “to determine the 
type of industry in which a company is participating.”  (Kidalov 2011).  
Specifically:  
Under SBA regulations, Contracting Officers are responsible 
for choosing the NAICS code that best describes the “principal 
purpose” of the product or service acquired.  The basis for 
this decision is subject to a complex six-factor test, which 
includes (1) “industry descriptions” in the NAICS Manual, (2) 
description of the product or service in solicitation 
documents, (3) “value and importance” of the procurement’s 
components, (4) functions of products and services procured, 
(5) prior procurement classifications in similar purchases, and 
(6) the purposes of the Small Business Act.  A procurement is 
usually classified according to the component that accounts 
for the greatest percentage of contract value.        (Kidalov 
2011). 
Each NAICS code has a matching small business size standard based 
on either employment or revenue.  “SBA’s employee-based caps are 
calculated prior to each representation or certification of small 
business size based on the average number of employees for each 
pay period “over the preceding 12 months.”  (Kidalov 2011). Part-
time or temporary employees count the same as full-time employees. 
Total average employees of all entities considered affiliated with the 
enterprise that have been employed by those affiliates over the 
preceding twelve-month period (even if affiliation arose more 
recently) are included in the count.” (Kidalov 2011).  In terms of 
classifying bundled and consolidated awards by NAICS Code, over 
$426 million or 51 percent of the value went to firms in just 3 NAICS 
categories: Facilities Support Services at almost 22 percent, Metal 
Tank (Heavy Gauge) Manufacturing, at almost 17 percent, and Radio 
& Television Broadcasting and Wireless Telecommunications 
Equipment Manufacturing, at about 12.5 percent, for a total of about 
$426 million.  Mid-range NAICS categories, Engineering Services, 
Bare Printed Circuit Board Manufacturing, Commercial & Institutional 
Building Construction, Heavy Duty Truck Manufacturing, Industrial 
Building Construction, accounted for just under $323 million or about 
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39 percent.  Low-range NAICS categories, Other Guided Missile and 
Space Vehicle Parts and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing, 
accounted for just under $83 million or about 10 percent.  
 
BUNDLING/CONSOLIDATION NEEDS BY NAICS CODE 
NAICS Code Descriptions Total Contracts Value Share 
PASSENGER CAR LEASING $5,638,320.00 0.68% 
PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATION MANUFACTURING 
$5,674,321.96 0.68% 
AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING $6,770,916.00 0.81% 
PORT AND HARBOR OPERATIONS $7,652,611.42 0.92% 
REMEDIATION SERVICES $11,714,772.00 1.41% 
OTHER HEAVY AND CIVIL ENGINEERING 
CONSTRUCTION 
$13,760,057.00 1.65% 
OTHER AIRCRAFT PARTS AND AUXILIARY 
EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING 
$15,538,153.90 1.87% 
OTHER GUIDED MISSILE AND SPACE VEHICLE PARTS 
AND AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING 
$16,120,500.00 1.94% 
ALL OTHER MISCELLANEOUS SCHOOLS AND 
INSTRUCTION 
$18,710,054.65 2.25% 
INDUSTRIAL BUILDING CONSTRUCTION $21,000,000.00 2.52% 
HEAVY DUTY TRUCK MANUFACTURING $46,353,072.00 5.57% 
COMMERCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING 
CONSTRUCTION 
$75,942,588.00 9.13% 
BARE PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD MANUFACTURING $79,342,491.00 9.54% 
ENGINEERING SERVICES $81,549,025.93 9.80% 
RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING AND 
WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 
MANUFACTURING 
$103,733,210.00 12.47% 
METAL TANK (HEAVY GAUGE) MANUFACTURING $140,671,605.00 16.91% 
FACILITIES SUPPORT SERVICES $181,777,036.32 21.85% 
Grand Total $831,948,735.18 100.00% 
Figure 4. Bundling/Consolidation Needs by NAICS Code 
 
There is no official SBA cross-reference between employment and 
revenue-based size standards, which may make it difficult to 
determine whether capable small firms are available.  However, a 
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suitable cross-reference may be established based on the SBA’s 
official number of small business contracting dollars per job 
supported as reported in the SBA’s official 2010 Annual Performance 
Report.  In FY2010, the SBA job support goal was $141,252.69 in 
Federal small business contract expenditure per job.  (SBA 2011.)  
Out of 17 NAICS categories in which bundled and consolidated 
contracts were awarded by the DON, the average value of such 
contracts in 14 NAICS categories was lower than the SBA size 
standard cap (or its equivalent for employee-based size standards).  
This translated in over $591 million of contract spending, or 71 
percent of value of bundled and consolidated contracts, that could 
have gone to small firms.  In 2 other categories, All Other 
Miscellaneous Schools and Instruction and Metal Tank (Heavy 
Gauge) Manufacturing, the average contract value was within three 
(3) times and two (2) times the value of the size standard cap.  This 
translated in over $100 million of contract spending, or 12 percent of 
value of bundled and consolidated contracts, that could have gone to 
small firms.  Only in one NAICS category, Engineering Services, was 
the average contract size within ten (10) times the size standard cap.  
This amounts to over $140 million, or just under 17 percent, of total 
value of bundled and consolidated contracts.  Thus, individual small 
firms were capable of performing the vast majority of bundled and 
consolidated contracts.  In two categories, teams or joint ventures of 
2 or 3 small businesses were capable of performing bundled and 
consolidated contracts. (OFPP 2002.)  In one category, teaming or 
joint venturing would have been difficult to secure because it would 
have required participation of up to 10 small firms.  Even then, small 
firms could have participated in that category’s contracts under the 
DOD Mentor-Protégé Program agreements with large businesses per 
DFARS Subpart 219.71.  (DFARS 2010.)      
 




























$18,710,054.65 $7,000,000.00 $7,000,000.00 3 
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$12,657,098.00 $33,500,000.00 $33,500,000.00 1 
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$40,774,512.97 $4,500,000.00 $4,500,000.00 10 
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$12,118,469.09 $35,500,000.00 $35,500,000.00 1 
HEAVY DUTY TRUCK 
MANUFACTURING 
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$7,000,000.00 $33,500,000.00 $33,500,000.00 1 
METAL TANK (HEAVY 
GAUGE) 
MANUFACTURING 
$140,671,605.00 500 $70,626,345.00 2 
OTHER AIRCRAFT 
PARTS AND AUXILIARY 
EQUIPMENT 
MANUFACTURING 
$7,769,076.95 1,000 $141,252,690.00 1 
OTHER GUIDED 
MISSILE AND SPACE 
VEHICLE PARTS AND 
AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT 
MANUFACTURING 
$16,120,500.00 1,000 $141,252,690.00 1 
OTHER HEAVY AND 
CIVIL ENGINEERING 
CONSTRUCTION 
$6,880,028.50 $33,500,000 $33,500,000.00 1 
PASSENGER CAR 
LEASING 




$5,674,321.96 750 $105,939,517.50 1 
PORT AND HARBOR 
OPERATIONS 








$34,577,736.67 750 $105,939,517.50 1 
REMEDIATION 
SERVICES 
$11,714,772.00 $14,000,000.00 $14,000,000.00 1 
Grand Total $18,907,925.80 *Based on SBA FY2010 Goal of Contract 
Expenditure Per Job Supported: $141,252.69 




FINDING 3. Bundling and Consolidation Materially Reduces 
Competition.  In addition to excluding small business concerns, 
bundled and consolidated contracts materially reduce full and open 
competition in the DON procurement market.  Only 70 percent of 
bundled and consolidated contracts value were awarded pursuant to 
full and open competition or legally equivalent procedures.  Fully over 
$242 million, or over 29 percent of contract value, was spent through 
sole source contracts.   Another 0.7 percent, or approximately $5.7 
IMPACT OF CONTRACT BUNDLING AND CONSOLIDATION 
3671 
million, was competed under FAR Part 13 Simplified Acquisition 
procedures which require competition only to the “maximum extent 
practicable” and allow for sole source brand name preferences.  (FAR 
2010.)            
 
COMPETITION FOR BUNDLED & CONSOLIDATED CONTRACTS 
Extent Competed Contracts Value Competition Share 
COMPETED UNDER SAP $5,674,321.96 0.68% 
FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION $583,964,220.32 70.19% 
NOT COMPETED $242,310,192.90 29.13% 
Grand Total $831,948,735.18 100.00% 
Figure 7. Competition for bundled and consolidated contracts 
 
FINDING 4. Bundling and Consolidation Hinders Preference for 
Commercial Items.  The FAR established a preference “maximizing 
the use of commercial products and services” in Section 1.102, and 
established procedures in FAR Part 12 and elsewhere to implement 
this preference.  (FAR 2010.)  Data shows that bundling and 
consolidation seriously undermines this preference.  By volume, 
DON’s top bundling and consolidation needs were Facilities 
Operations Support Services at 20.39 percent and Lubrication & Fuel 
Dispensing Equipment at 16.91 percent of total value of bundled and 
consolidated contracts, or over $310 million together.  Mid-range 
needs for bundled and consolidated contracts were for Electronic 
Assembly – BDS Cards – Associated Hardware, Electronic 
Countermeasure & Quick Reaction Equipment, Engineering & 
Technical Services, Maintenance, Repairs, Alterations of 
Miscellaneous Buildings, and Trucks & Wheeled Tractors, together 
accounting for 35.52 percent of total value of bundled and 
consolidated contracts, or about $296 million.  The remaining 
product and service needs, Guided Missile Launchers, Miscellaneous 
Aircraft Accessories Components, Maintenance-Repair-Alteration of 
Dining Facilities, Construction – All Other Non-Building Facilities, Fire 
Protection Services, Hazardous Substance Removal-Clean-up-
Disposal, and Construction - Other Industrial Buildings,  account for 
just under 16 percent of bundled and consolidated dollars, or about 
$133 million.  
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BUNDLING & CONSOLIDATION NEEDS BY PRODUCT/SERVICE 
Product/Service Description Contracts Value Share 
LEASE-RENT OF VEHICLES-TRAILERS-CYC $5,638,320.00 0.68% 
DRUGS AND BIOLOGICALS $5,674,321.96 0.68% 
MAINT-REP-ALT/AIRPORT RUNWAYS $5,905,588.00 0.71% 
CABLE CORD WIRE ASSEMBLY - COMM EQ $6,530,385.00 0.78% 
MAINT-REP OF AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS $6,770,916.00 0.81% 
LOGISTICS SUPPORT SERVICES $7,652,611.42 0.92% 
CONSTRUCT/OTHER INDUSTRIAL BLDGS $10,037,000.00 1.21% 
HARZ REMV/CLEAN-UP/DISP/OP $11,714,772.00 1.41% 
FIRE PROTECTION SERVICES $12,175,007.57 1.46% 
CONTRUCT/ALL OTHER NON-BLDG FACS $13,760,057.00 1.65% 
MAINT-REP-ALT/DINING FACILITIES $15,000,000.00 1.80% 
MISCL AIRCRAFT ACCESSORIES COMPS $15,538,153.90 1.87% 
LAUNCHERS, GUIDED MISSILE $16,120,500.00 1.94% 
OTHER ED & TRNG SVCS $18,710,054.65 2.25% 
BLDGS & FAC / ADMIN & SVC BLDGS $21,000,000.00 2.52% 
COMM SECURITY EQ & COMPS $21,862,016.00 2.63% 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/SUPPORT SERVICES $32,111,171.93 3.86% 
MAINT-REP-ALT/MISC BLDGS $45,000,000.00 5.41% 
TRUCKS AND TRUCK TRACTORS, WHEELED $46,353,072.00 5.57% 
ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SERVICES $56,309,048.00 6.77% 
ELE ASSEMB-BDS CARDS-ASSOC HARDWARE $72,812,106.00 8.75% 
ELEC COUNTERMEASURE & QUICK REAC EQ $75,000,000.00 9.01% 
LUBRICATION & FUEL DISPENSING EQ $140,671,605.00 16.91% 
FACILITIES OPERATIONS SUPPORT SVCS $169,602,028.75 20.39% 
Grand Total $831,948,735.18 100.00% 
Figure 8.Bundling/Consolidation Needs by Product/Service 
 
Commercial items procedures were used only to procure Drugs and 
Biologicals, Rent – Lease of Vehicles, Logistics Support Services, and 
Other Education and Training Services (a turnkey Counterterrorism 
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Training Center).  Commercial items procedures were not applicable 
to Construction of Industrial Buildings and All Other Buildings, as well 
as Buildings and Facilities. Several additional categories of 
requirements seem to be either not suitable or of questionable 
suitability for commercial items designation, such as 
Communications Security Equipment, Electronic Countermeasure & 
Quick Reaction Equipment, and Guided Missile Launchers.  However, 
numerous categories appear to be good candidates for commercial 
item designation, including: Fire Protection Services, Facilities 
Operation Support Services, Engineering & Technical Services, 
Lubrication & Fuel Dispensing Equipment, Electronic Assembly of 
BDS Cards and Associate Hardware, Program Management & 
Support Services, Cable Cord Wire Assembly for Communications 
Equipment, Miscellaneous Aircraft Accessories Components, and 
Maintenance, Repair, and Alteration of Aircraft Components, Airport 
Runways, Dining Facilities, and Miscellaneous Buildings, and 
Hazardous Material Removal.     
 
IMPACT OF BUNDLING AND CONSOLIDATION ON COMMERCIAL SUPPLIERS 
Commercial Item Purchases Contracts Value Share 
COMMERCIAL ITEM $37,675,308.03 4.53% 
DRUGS AND BIOLOGICALS $5,674,321.96 0.68% 
LEASE-RENT OF VEHICLES-TRAILERS-CYC $5,638,320.00 0.68% 
LOGISTICS SUPPORT SERVICES $7,652,611.42 0.92% 
OTHER ED & TRNG SVCS $18,710,054.65 2.25% 
COMMERCIAL ITEM PROCEDURES NOT USED $794,273,427.15 95.47% 
BLDGS & FAC / ADMIN & SVC BLDGS $21,000,000.00 2.52% 
CABLE CORD WIRE ASSEMBLY - COMM EQ $6,530,385.00 0.78% 
COMM SECURITY EQ & COMPS $21,862,016.00 2.63% 
CONSTRUCT/OTHER INDUSTRIAL BLDGS $10,037,000.00 1.21% 
CONTRUCT/ALL OTHER NON-BLDG FACS $13,760,057.00 1.65% 
ELE ASSEMB-BDS CARDS-ASSOC HARDWARE $72,812,106.00 8.75% 
ELEC COUNTERMEASURE & QUICK REAC EQ $75,000,000.00 9.01% 
ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SERVICES $56,309,048.00 6.77% 
FACILITIES OPERATIONS SUPPORT SVCS $169,602,028.75 20.39% 
FIRE PROTECTION SERVICES $12,175,007.57 1.46% 
HARZ REMV/CLEAN-UP/DISP/OP $11,714,772.00 1.41% 
LAUNCHERS, GUIDED MISSILE $16,120,500.00 1.94% 
LUBRICATION & FUEL DISPENSING EQ $140,671,605.00 16.91% 
MAINT-REP OF AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS $6,770,916.00 0.81% 
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MAINT-REP-ALT/AIRPORT RUNWAYS $5,905,588.00 0.71% 
MAINT-REP-ALT/DINING FACILITIES $15,000,000.00 1.80% 
MAINT-REP-ALT/MISC BLDGS $45,000,000.00 5.41% 
MISCL AIRCRAFT ACCESSORIES COMPS $15,538,153.90 1.87% 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/SUPPORT SERVICES $32,111,171.93 3.86% 
TRUCKS AND TRUCK TRACTORS, WHEELED $46,353,072.00 5.57% 
Grand Total $831,948,735.18 100.00% 
Figure 9. Impact on Commercial Item Suppliers 
 
Approximately 95 percent of bundled and consolidated FY2010 DON 
contracts, or approximately $794.3 million, were reported as 
potentially eligible for commercial items procedures.  Altogether, 
contracts reported in FPDS as non-applicable for commercial items 
procedures and contracts with requirements descriptions likely 
unsuitable for commercial item procedures amount to just under 19 
percent, or almost $158 million, of total value for bundled and 
consolidated contracts. Thus, data shows that over 81 percent of 
bundled and consolidated contract dollars, or over $674 million, were 
eligible for awards using commercial items procedures.  A stunning 
$636 million of these commercial item procedure-eligible contracts 
were not awarded using commercial item procedures.  This 
represents 76.51 of total bundled and consolidated contracts, or 94 
percent of total commercial item-eligible bundled and consolidated 
contracts.      
     
USE OF COMMERCIAL ITEMS PROCEDURES IN BUNDLED AND CONSOLIDATED CONTRACTS 
CONTRACT TYPE Amount Share 
NON-COMMERCIAL ITEMS  (ACTUAL OR LIKELY) $157,779,573.00 18.97% 
COMMERCIAL ITEMS $674,169,162.18 81.03% 
COMMERCIAL ITEM LIKELY – PROCEDURES NOT USED $636,493,854.15 76.51% 
COMMERCIAL ITEM – PROCEDURES USED                                         $37,675,308.03 4.53% 
Grand Total $831,948,735.18 100.00% 
Figure 10. Summary Use of Commercial Item Procedures. 
 
FINDING 5. Bundling and Consolidation Seriously Hinders DON’s 
Attempts to Pay Its Contractors for Performance (Use of Performance-
Based Services Acquisitions).  Data suggests a stunningly negative 
detrimental impact of bundling and consolidation of service contracts 
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on the use of Performance-Based Acquisitions (PBAs) per FAR 
Subpart 37.6. (FAR 2010.)  Approximately $431 million, or about 52 
percent of total FY2010 value of DON bundled and consolidated 
contracts, were eligible for award using PBA terms.  The remaining 
$400 million were either construction or manufacturing contracts, 
and were not eligible for use of PBAs.  Over $336 billion, or 78 
percent of bundled and consolidated contracts value eligible for 
PBAs, were awarded without the use of PBA terms.  Only 22 percent, 
or over $95 million, were awarded using PBA terms.   In comparison, 
as of FY2008, OFPP established a goal for Performance-Based 
Acquisitions in 50 percent of eligible contracts.  (OFPP 2007).  This 
data suggests that, as more service requirements got bundled and 
consolidated, DON buyers simply lost control over performance 
objectives across the multiple service requirements lines.   
 
PERFORMANCE-BASED ACQUISITION ELIGIBLE SERVICE CONTRACTS                                                                      
REPORTED AS BUNDLED OR CONSOLIDATED 
PBA USE Contracts Value PBA Share 
NO - SERVICE WHERE PBA IS NOT USED. 
$336,011,947.3
2 77.89% 




Figure 11. Performance-based acquisitions in bundled/consolidated 
contracts. 
 
FINDING 6.  Private Sector “Best  Practices” Apparently Have a Minor 
Impact on  Bundling/Consolidation.   Data suggests that the impact of 
private-sector performance-based “best practices” described in the 
Moore, et al. (2008) study on bundling and consolidation is very 
small.  Requirements with descriptions suitable for such “best 
practices” (system-of-systems engineering, Total Lifecycle Costs, or 
Performance-Based Logistics) account for under 10 percent of 
volume of bundled and consolidated contracts.   Thus, it appears that 
90 percent of DON bundled and consolidation contract dollars were 
awarded in this way for reasons other than performance.       
 
BUNDLING/CONSOLIDATION DUE TO PRIVATE SECTOR “BEST PRACTICES”: SYSTEM-OF-
SYSTEMS, TOTAL LIFECYCLE COST, OR PERFORMANCE-BASED LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS 
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Requirements Value Share 
MAINT-REP OF AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS $6,770,916.00 0.81% 
MISCL AIRCRAFT ACCESSORIES COMPS $15,538,153.90 1.87% 
LAUNCHERS, GUIDED MISSILE $16,120,500.00 1.94% 
LOGISTICS SUPPORT SERVICES $7,652,611.42 0.92% 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/SUPPORT SERVICES $32,111,171.93 3.86% 
Total $78,193,353.25 9.40% 
Figure 12.  Bundling/consolidation due to private sector “best  
practices.” 
 
FINDING 7: Consolidation and Bundling Hurts the U.S. Defense 
Industrial Base.  Data shows that bundling and consolidation hurts 
not only U.S. small businesses, but the U.S. defense industrial base 
as a whole.  The negative impact on U.S. firms of all sizes is 
significant.  Foreign-based businesses have received almost $282 
million, or over 33 percent of total value of FY2010 bundled and 
consolidated contracts (though some of that money went to foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. firms).   Of that, $24 million or 2.8 percent of total 
value of bundled and consolidated contracts was designated as 
foreign-funded (non-Foreign Military Sales).  Those  foreign-funded  
contracts included $15 million  to an Italian firm under NAICS code 
for Industrial Building Construction work in Italy (at about 1.8 percent 
of  total value), as well as $9 million to a Spanish firm for Commercial 
& Institutional  Building Construction in Spain (at about 1 percent of 
total value).  However, descriptions and similar contracts awarded to 
the same recipients provide reasons for questioning the foreign 
funding designation.  Other internationally sourced bundled and 
consolidated contracts include the following NAICS categories: 
Facilities Support Services at about $181.8 million or 21.85 percent 
of total contracts value, Industrial Building Construction, at $21 
million or 2.52 percent of total contracts value, Commercial and 
Institutional Building Construction at $60 million or 7.21 percent, 
Port and Harbor Operations at approximately $7.7 million or 0.92 
percent, and Passenger Car Leasing at over $5.6 million or 0.68 
percent.  As shown above, in all of these NAICS categories the 
average bundled and consolidated DON contracts are within the 
capability of small businesses to perform.  Thus, the explanation for 
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these awards to foreign firms must be found in other barriers to entry 
other than lack of performance capability, such as local licensing 
requirements.  For instance, in Italy, offerors on U.S. projects were 
“required to submit a Societa Organismi D’Attestazione (SOA), a 
certification evidencing compliance with Italian law regarding the 
qualifications of companies competing for public works contracts. . . .  
An SOA certifies a company to be qualified in particular categories 
and classifications of work. . . . Submission of an SOA in the name of 
another contractor is permissible in certain circumstances under a 
system called avvalimento, authorized by Italian law.”  (GAO 2010).     
 
International Contracts: Contractor Home Countries, Places of 
Performance, NAICS Descriptions 
Contracts Value Share 
BAHRAIN $5,638,320.00 0.68% 
BAHRAIN $5,638,320.00 0.68% 
PASSENGER CAR LEASING $5,638,320.00 0.68% 
ITALY $202,777,036.32 24.37% 
ITALY $202,777,036.32 24.37% 
FACILITIES SUPPORT SERVICES $181,777,036.32 21.85% 
INDUSTRIAL BUILDING CONSTRUCTION $21,000,000.00 2.52% 
MALTA $7,652,611.42 0.92% 
MISSING $7,652,611.42 0.92% 
PORT AND HARBOR OPERATIONS $7,652,611.42 0.92% 
SPAIN $60,000,000.00 7.21% 
SPAIN $60,000,000.00 7.21% 
COMMERCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING 
CONSTRUCTION $60,000,000.00 7.21% 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES $5,905,588.00 0.71% 
KENYA $5,905,588.00 0.71% 
COMMERCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING 
CONSTRUCTION $5,905,588.00 0.71% 
UNITED STATES $549,975,179.44 66.11% 
Grand Total $831,948,735.18 100.00% 
Figure 13. International Sourcing of Bundled and Consolidated 
Contracts. 
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FINDING 8. U.S. Taxpayers Were Likely Shortchanged on Expected 
Benefits from Bundling and Consolidation. As stated above, Congress 
required Federal agencies to obtain a 5 to 10 percent premium in 
“measurably substantial benefits” from contract bundling or to prove 
“substantially exceeding” benefits from consolidation.  It is DOD 
policy to “strongly encourage” its buyers “to quantify the benefits” 
regardless of whether contract is bundled or consolidated. (DOD 
OSBP 2007).  Thus, on over $831 million in bundled and 
consolidated contracts, the expected benefits should have been 
valued at over $77.7 million.  No agency files were checked to 
examine whether these benefits have been documented.  However, 
over 71 percent of these benefits would have been expected from 
contracts which individual small firms could perform, and another 
over 12 percent would have been expected from contracts which 
teams up to 3 small firms could perform.  Without reviewing contract 
files, it is hard to assume that large firms provided the kind of 
benefits on over 83 percent of bundled and consolidated contracts 
value that small firms could not have also provided.  A contrary 
outcome is much more plausible.  
  






Contracts Capable of Small Business 
Performance $591,018,049.60 71.04% $55,217,923.18 
Contracts - Easy Small Business 
Teaming Capability $100,259,080.58 12.05% $9,367,054.38 
 Contracts - Difficult Small Business 
Teaming Capability $140,671,605.00 16.91% $13,142,735.46 
Total $831,948,735.18 100.00% $77,727,713.02 
Figure 14.  Projected value of expected benefits from bundling and 
consolidation. 
 
CONCLUSION: OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The above analysis of FY2010 DON bundled and consolidated 
contracts casts serious doubts on the validity of three key 
propositions advanced in recent studies of bundling and 
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consolidations in the DOD.  As to the proposition that consolidation is 
not a major obstacle for small firms seeking defense contracts, data 
shows that commands which were responsible for two-thirds of 
consolidation and bundling were anchors weighing down DON’s 
achievement of small business goals.  Data also shows that the 
SBA/OFPP methodology vastly understated the exclusionary impact of 
bundling and consolidation on small businesses.  As to the 
proposition that small firms are legitimately excluded from 
consolidated contracts because they lack the capability to perform 
the military’s needs, data shows that small firms were capable to 
perform the vast majority of such contracts spending awarded by the 
DON.  Data also shows that only a small portion of consolidated 
requirements likely involved so-called private sector “best practices.” 
As to the proposition that consolidation and bundling benefit the 
defense acquisition system, data shows that bundling and 
consolidation seriously undermines fundamental principles such as 
paying for performance, competition, preference for use of 
commercial terms and suppliers, and support for the U.S. defense 
industrial base.  With regards to the defense industrial base, contract 
consolidation may have been driven by barriers to entry created by 
foreign governments hosting DON bases or ships.  Finally, because 
small firms were found capable to perform most bundled or 
consolidated contracts, the expected value of benefits to the 
taxpayers from consolidation is highly questionable.   Of course, 
further research would be necessary to determine how these data 
trends hold across time.    
 
These findings suggest innovative new strategies which SECNAV 
OSBP can employ to reduce bundling and consolidation.  First, DON 
small business performance can drastically improve should SECNAV 
OSBP begin to annually track top bundling and consolidation 
commands with additional oversight.  Second, to enable easier 
finding of capable small firms, teams, or mentor-protégé 
arrangements, SECNAV OSBP should create a simplified size 
standards-to-contracts value conversion chart where all size 
standards are expressed in dollars.  Third, SECNAV OSBP should 
amend the Navy-Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(NMCARS) to ensure review by the Navy Competition Advocate 
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General of most contracts which are both not competed and are 
bundled or consolidated.  Fourth, SECNAV OSBP should amend 
NMCARS to ban or strictly limit the ability of buying commands not to 
use Performance-Based Acquisition terms and procedures on all 
bundled and consolidated services contracts.  Fifth, SECNAV OSBP 
should amend NMCARS to strictly limit not using commercial item 
terms and procedures on eligible bundled or consolidated contracts.  
Sixth, SECNAV OSBP should amend NMCARS to require consideration 
of impact on U.S. defense industrial base when foreign firms receive 
bundled or consolidated contracts.  Seventh, SECNAV OSBP should 
review, revise, or enforce international trade and defense agreements 
to reduce trade barriers and help U.S. firms get work on U.S. own 
bases overseas.  These strategies will not only result in greater small 
business participation, but will also enable DON to achieve broad 
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